National

Obama's Fateful Choice
Editorial

This article appeared in the November 9, 2009 edition of The Nation.
October 21, 2009

President Obama will soon make what could be the defining decision of his presidency. The course he chooses in Afghanistan will tell us a lot about the kind of country we will become during his administration.

Obama has called Afghanistan a war of necessity and fed the notion that it is the "good war," in contrast to the one in Iraq. But Afghanistan policy should not be a hostage to the president's past rhetoric. On a matter of such critical importance, the White House needs to look anew at the situation and consider the likely consequences of this decision for national security and for America's other needs.

The course of the war over the past eight years, along with the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, should have led the White House to explore a broader range of options than the ones the president has before him. Neither sending more troops to expand our counterinsurgency nor reverting to a forward-based counterterrorism operation would enhance national security or be in the best interests of Afghanistan. The president should expand the policy review to include alternatives that would allow Washington to disengage militarily and pursue a regional diplomatic initiative to bring about a new power-sharing arrangement, along the lines spelled out by Robert Dreyfuss.

The US experience in Afghanistan makes it clear that this is not a war of necessity. We have learned--or should have learned--that we can keep Americans safe from terrorism even if remnants of the Al Qaeda leadership continue to enjoy relative safe haven in Pakistan or parts of Afghanistan. Indeed, the greater danger today comes from a small and dispersed terrorist network that has at most a tangential connection to the region. American safety therefore depends not on eliminating faraway Al Qaeda safe havens but on common-sense counterterrorism and homeland defense measures: extensive intelligence cooperation, expert police work, border control and the occasional surgical use of special forces to disrupt imminent attacks.

We should also have a better appreciation of Pakistan's complicated political landscape and how the war in Afghanistan affects it. Clearly, some groups in the Pakistani intelligence service and military tolerate or even encourage the Taliban as a way to thwart US and Indian interests in Afghanistan. But we also know that a civilian Pakistani government and its military will curb the Taliban when they feel themselves threatened or decide it is in Pakistan's best interest. We should understand that escalating the war only creates more divisions within Pakistan and strengthens the forces there that have supported the Taliban. Thus, the best safeguard for stability is to support the evolution of Pakistan's democratic government, which for its own reasons rejects extremism.

The course of the Afghan war also suggests that this is no longer the good war that those arguing for more troops believe it is. In eight years we have made little progress in creating a viable state or system of government, building a national army and police or creating an economy less dependent on the drug trade. Contrary to the arguments of some in the administration, it is not for lack of trying. The United States and its NATO partners have had more than 40,000 troops in Afghanistan since 2006 and have spent more than $300 billion on military and civilian operations. We of course should do more to provide development and humanitarian assistance. But it is telling that so far all we have produced is a growing insurgency and a corrupt government that has lost whatever popular support it may have had.

To be sure, a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan would bring new suffering for many Afghans, especially women, and many Afghans look to the United States for protection and security. But just as surely, a substantial, determined minority does not see our presence there that way, and that is a prescription for insurgency. Indeed, the more the United States has sought to expand its military reach, the more the insurgency has flared, and the more civilians, including women, have been victims of the violence. Not even the most sophisticated counterinsurgency can mask that in the eyes of many Afghans, we are foreign occupiers with our own imperial designs. Nor can it make up for the many shortcomings of what is seen as the illegitimate and dysfunctional regime of President Hamid Karzai, which has tried to centralize power (and wealth) at the expense of outlying provinces and has stolen the recent election. After immense international pressure, Karzai finally agreed to a runoff with his main competitor. That's a positive development, but it doesn't go nearly far enough in reforming the corrupt power structure. We should know that turning an illegitimate government into a legitimate one is beyond our capabilities--and that fighting extremists the Afghan government and army won't fight is a fool's errand.

Understandably, a majority of Americans have turned against the war. The number will grow as the costs and burdens become more evident. Under the right conditions, the impulse to help Afghans build a better future is commendable, but something is wrong when it becomes so tied up with a flawed military strategy or when it diverts our attention and energy from the serious problems we face here and abroad.

We cannot ignore that we are a nation struggling to recover from a debilitating economic crisis, with ever larger problems and fewer resources to deal with them. We cannot ignore that the crisis has devastated millions of American families who need the government's help. The ballooning debt is forcing the administration to match every new expenditure with a spending cut. As a practical matter, that means every dollar we spend on the war in Afghanistan will be one less dollar to create jobs or provide health insurance at home, or to solve international problems.

Given these realities, how can a president who promised to renew the nation justify the immense cost that sending yet more troops to Afghanistan would entail? How can he do so on behalf of an Afghan government that is so corrupt and dysfunctional that it does not have the support of its own people? We believe the president should listen to the voices in Congress who are urging him to begin planning a responsible exit strategy.

AMEN..

L.A.Times
Editorial
Afghanistan: Now what?
After the election mess, Obama has little choice but to work with President Hamid Karzai's weakened government.

November 3, 2009

In the first round of balloting, Afghan President Hamid Karzai received 1 million "ghost votes" from people who simply didn't exist. When those were eliminated, he lacked the requisite plurality and was pressed by his Western backers into agreeing to a runoff -- only to see his challenger drop out in anticipation of further fraud. Faced with a one-man race, the Independent Election Commission on Monday canceled the second round and returned Karzai to power for a second five-year term.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has tried to put a positive spin on all this, saying that candidates pull out of elections even in the United States and that the withdrawal of former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah does not affect the legitimacy of the process. But the Obama administration looks silly pretending this is anything but a mess. Although we had our doubts about the Afghan government's ability to pull off a safe and clean runoff, we had hoped there would be one. Now, although he received more votes than anyone else the first time and likely would have won a second vote, Karzai looks like a president by default, and his government looks increasingly illegitimate.

President Obama telephoned Karzai to congratulate him on his second term and to try to move forward, urging formation of a Cabinet that is representative of the country's ethnic and political groups, and reforms to address the corruption and incompetence that has eroded Afghan confidence in Karzai. This is at the root of the problem not only with the presidential election but with the whole U.S. enterprise in Afghanistan. After eight years, nearly $225 billion spent and 68,000 troops currently deployed, it is difficult to see progress in nation-building, and the Taliban is resurgent.

The status quo cannot continue. Obama has yet to decide whether he will heed the call of the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, for up to 40,000 more troops, but he has said he will not walk away from the country altogether. If that's the case, it seems Obama has no choice but to hold his nose and press on with a weakened ally. Given that, he must push for a national unity government in Kabul to broaden its base of support and, at the same time, help develop a more decentralized administration of a land that has always been a loose collection of tribes and districts. Decentralization would allow the West to spread its resources to regional leaders rather than concentrating them in the hands of Karzai and his clique. Any U.S. strategy for stabilizing Afghanistan and drawing support away from the Taliban depends on a political leadership perceived as legitimate and a government that serves its people.

The Afghanistan War
High Cost, Low Odds
By Stephen M. Walt

This article appeared in the November 9, 2009 edition of The Nation.
October 21, 2009

Stephen M. Walt: Staying in Afghanistan will cost many more American soldiers' lives and hundreds of billions of dollars. Is it worth it?

We know the price will be high. The United States has spent more than $223 billion on the Afghan war since 2001, and it now costs roughly $65 billion annually. The actual bill will be significantly higher, however, as these figures omit the replacement cost of military equipment, veterans' benefits and other war-related expenses. Most important, more than 850 US soldiers have already been killed and several thousand have been seriously wounded.

And we are not close to winning. The Obama administration admits that the challenges are "daunting," and a recent pro-war report from the Center for American Progress said success will require "prolonged U.S. engagement using all elements of U.S. national power" for "as long as another ten years." Success also requires creating an army and police force larger than the Afghan government can afford, which means Kabul will need US assistance indefinitely.

The bottom line: staying in Afghanistan will cost many more dead American soldiers--and, inevitably, Afghan civilians--and hundreds of billions of additional dollars.

But might the benefits be worth the costs? President Obama says we have to prevent Afghanistan from becoming "an even larger safe haven from which Al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans." But defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan isn't the key to thwarting Al Qaeda. Indeed, even if our counterinsurgency and nation-building efforts exceed all expectations, the Afghan government will still have only limited authority over much of the country and will be unable to prevent Al Qaeda cells from relocating there.

Moreover, Al Qaeda doesn't need lots of territory or elaborate bases to plot attacks and other conspiracies; all it needs are safe houses in various parts of the world and a supply of potential martyrs. Al Qaeda clones already exist in Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere; so denying its founders a "safe haven" in Afghanistan will not make that network less lethal. If Al Qaeda is our main concern, fighting in Afghanistan is increasingly a distraction.

Finally, America's odds of winning this war are slim. The Karzai government is corrupt, incompetent and resistant to reform. The Taliban have sanctuaries in Pakistan and can hide among the local populace, making it possible for them simply to outlast us. Pakistan has backed the Afghan Taliban in the past and is not a reliable partner now. Our European allies are war-weary and looking for the exits. The more troops we send and the more we interfere in Afghan affairs, the more we look like foreign occupiers and the more resistance we will face. There is therefore little reason to expect a US victory.

Fortunately, pulling US troops out of Afghanistan will not make Al Qaeda stronger. If the Taliban regain power, they may conclude it is too risky to let Osama bin Laden return. But even if they did, a backward and landlocked country like Afghanistan is a poor location from which to attack the United States, which is why the 9/11 plot was conducted out of Hamburg, Germany. If Al Qaeda's founders have to hide somewhere, better in Afghanistan than anywhere else.

And hide they will, because Afghanistan won't be a safe haven. Bin Laden could operate somewhat freely there before 9/11, because the United States wasn't going after him all-out. Those days are long gone. The Taliban will not be able to protect him from US commandos, cruise missiles and armed drones. He and his henchmen will always have to stay in hiding, which is why even an outright Taliban victory will not enhance their position very much.

In short, US victory in Afghanistan won't put an end to Al Qaeda, and getting out won't make it more dangerous. And if the outcome in Afghanistan has little effect on the threat Al Qaeda poses, there is little reason to squander more American blood and treasure there.

Obama's decision should be easy, given that the costs of the war are rising, the benefits are few and the odds of success are small. If he explains that calculus to the American people and says it is time to leave, most of them will agree.

But i thought he was gonna end the wars and bring everyone home. HMMMMMMM!

That is what I thought to. I guess he has decided it is better to maintain the status quo and just accept the loss of lives and money.

Obama should say we will stay if we can destroy the opium fields, as long as they exist we will fail.Corruption and greed is rampant with drugs.

We're never going to be able to destroy the opium fields. They've grown there far longer than we've been a country, and they will continue to grow there long after we're done - which will be sooner than we like if we don't get out of Afghanistan.

Why do we think we'll be more successful than the Soviet Union was?

BTW. Obama didn't promise to bring all the troops home. In fact, he promised to increase the number in Afghanistan. This might have made sense so long as there was a democratic government in Kabul that had the support of the people. Now that we're merely propping up yet another corrupt government, our efforts there are doomed.

I can only hope Obama sees this, and is simply focusing on the Waziristan border area, drilling down on Al Qaida. If he's entertaining any further ideas of "winning" in Afghanistan, then he's drinking the McChrystal (Tillman-coverup-architect) koolaid.